The first week of UN Tax Convention negotiations exposed a central divide: whether the Convention will establish strong new commitments capable of reforming an unequal international tax system or remain closely tied to existing rules and institutions. Debates also focused on civil society participation, human rights and whether the Convention’s future institutions will have the authority and resources to deliver meaningful change.

 

 

DAY 1 | DAY 2 | DAY 3 | DAY 4 | DAY 5

 

DAY 1

 

The fifth session of negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation opened in New York on 3 August 2026 with an immediate reminder that the legitimacy of the future international tax system will depend not only on the rules States adopt, but also on who is allowed into the room to shape them. 

Before substantive negotiations began, Türkiye opposed the participation of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), an organisation with a history spanning more than three decades and a key role in the human rights movement in Africa. It raised allegations concerning the organisation’s financial conduct and urged other States to vote against its inclusion. China and Bangladesh joined Türkiye in voting against the organisation’s participation. 

Fortunately, an overwhelming majority of States rejected this attempt, with more than 40 delegations voting to allow KHRC to participate. Ireland expressly defended inclusive, multistakeholder engagement and the inclusion of non-governmental organisations. 

The outcome was welcomed. The precedent, however, remains deeply troubling. It is not the first time that States have voted against the participation of individual NGOs in this space.  

Civil society participation in negotiations concerning a global tax convention should not depend on whether individual States are willing to tolerate organisations that may scrutinise their conduct. Nor should participation be vulnerable to allegations raised from the floor, without a transparent and consistent process for assessing them. Any objection to the accreditation of a civil society organisation must be handled through fair procedures that protect organisations from arbitrary or politically motivated exclusion. 

Far from being an isolated incident, this episode illustrates a broader structural trend towards limiting participation in the new tax regime. In the current zero draft, articles 13 and 14 establish the future Conference of the States Parties and its subsidiary bodies but contain no guarantees for the participation of civil society, affected communities, trade unions, researchers or other relevant stakeholders. 

This is a significant omission. The Convention is intended to create an evolving framework, with many of its rules, implementation mechanisms and future protocols to be developed after its adoption. Unless meaningful participation is protected in the Convention itself, access to future meetings may be left entirely to rules of procedure negotiated later by States. 

Civil society must be able to do more than observe from the back of the room. The Convention should guarantee timely access to information and negotiating documents, opportunities to submit written contributions, the ability to intervene in meetings, participation in subsidiary bodies and consultations, and transparent procedures for organising side events and contributing technical expertise. 

These safeguards should apply not only during the present negotiations, but throughout the future life of the Convention. 

 

A New Framework or a Vehicle for Preserving the Status Quo? 

The first substantive debate concerned the objectives and principles contained in Articles 1 and 2. A recurring dividing line emerged over whether the Convention should establish a genuinely new and equitable framework or merely complement the international tax architecture that already exists. 

Several delegations, led largely but not exclusively by countries from the Global North, called for explicit language requiring consistency, complementarity or synergies with existing tax instruments and institutions. 

The European Union, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Japan, Italy and others warned against duplication, parallel rules and legal uncertainty. 

Legal coherence and predictability are legitimate concerns. However, avoiding duplication cannot become a euphemism for insulating existing institutions and standards from democratic scrutiny or substantive reform. 

The present international tax architecture was developed through forums in which many developing countries did not participate on an equal footing. It has also failed to prevent most countries from losing approximately USD 492 billion every year to cross-border tax abuse. 

These are resources that could otherwise support public health systems, education, social protection, climate action and other economic, social and cultural rights. 

States have an obligation to mobilise and use the maximum of their available resources for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. International tax rules are therefore not simply a technical matter. They directly affect whether governments can finance the public services and institutions required to fulfil those obligations. 

A UN Tax Convention will not fulfil its mandate if it simply incorporates standards developed elsewhere or limits itself to identifying gaps left by existing initiatives. 

Its transformative potential lies precisely in enabling all States to negotiate international tax rules on an equal footing and to reconsider arrangements that have produced unequal taxing rights and persistent revenue losses. 

This point was strongly articulated by Kenya, which emphasised that the mandate is to establish a new framework, rather than simply complement what already exists. Kenya also noted that existing arrangements have not been equitable, particularly for developing countries. 

Brazil similarly warned that inserting references to other forums into the Convention’s objectives could place the UN process in a subordinate role. Tanzania stressed that the mandate is not to mirror existing instruments but to develop a new framework, while Algeria noted that current agreements are imperfect and must be reviewed, improved and updated. 

The African Group, India and several other delegations also argued that questions concerning the relationship between the Convention and existing instruments should be addressed in the article specifically dedicated to that issue, rather than being inserted into the Convention’s objectives and principles. 

 

Why Article 21 Is Significant 

This makes the defence of the current Article 21 especially important. 

As presently conceived, Article 21 would create a legal duty for States Parties to work progressively towards adapting their existing international tax agreements to the Convention. 

It would not automatically invalidate or override bilateral treaties. Nor would it impose immediate and unpredictable changes. Its implementation would instead take place gradually, including through subsequent decisions and processes under the Conference of the States Parties. 

This is precisely what can provide legal certainty and predictability: a common direction of travel combined with progressive implementation. 

Removing or weakening this obligation would risk leaving the Convention disconnected from the dense network of existing tax treaties through which taxing rights are currently allocated. 

A framework convention must be capable of evolving, but evolution requires a legal bridge between its new principles and the rules already in force. Article 21 provides that bridge. 

 

Human Rights and Sustainable Development Enter the Debate 

The afternoon discussion offered some encouraging signs. 

• Brazil called for stronger references to human rights, gender, race and progressive taxation, as well as a mechanism for periodic review by the Conference of the States Parties. 
• Mexico supported the inclusion of human rights and explicit economic, social and cultural rights priorities. 
• Jamaica highlighted the environmental pillar of sustainable development and referred to common but differentiated responsibilities and the International Court of Justice’s climate advisory opinion. 
• Norway and the United Kingdom also supported strengthening the draft’s human rights and environmental dimensions. 

These interventions underscore what is at stake. 

International tax cooperation is not an isolated technical exercise. Decisions about taxing rights, illicit financial flows and corporate tax avoidance determine whether States possess the resources required to meet their human rights obligations and respond to the climate emergency. 

The opening day therefore revealed two interconnected battles that will shape the Convention’s future: 

1. Whether the UN process will be genuinely open to civil society and to those affected by international tax rules. 
2. Whether the Convention will transform an unequal international tax architecture or be confined by the standards and institutions it was created to improve. 

On Day 1, civil society’s presence in the room was successfully defended. The task now is to ensure that such participation becomes a permanent right and that the Convention retains the ambition necessary to deliver meaningful change. 

 

 

DAY 2

 

 

The second day of negotiations on the UN Tax Convention moved into some of its most consequential substantive provisions: the fair allocation of taxing rights, the taxation of high-net-worth individuals and tax-related illicit financial flows. 

Across Articles 5, 6 and 7, a recurring question emerged: will the Convention merely encourage States to cooperate, or will it establish concrete obligations capable of changing how taxing rights and revenues are distributed internationally? 

 

Article 5: What Does a ‘Fair Allocation’ of Taxing Rights Require? 

Article 5 sits at the heart of the Convention. It concerns the fair allocation of taxing rights, including how taxation should respond to increasingly globalised and digitalised economic activity. 

For many developing countries and regional organisations, the provision is fundamental to the promise of a more equitable international tax system. The African Union stressed that Article 5 is one of the Convention’s central provisions, providing an assurance that countries will be able to tax wealth generated within their jurisdictions. The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) similarly supported the African Group’s approach and stressed that achieving a genuinely fair allocation of taxing rights may require the renegotiation of existing tax treaties. 

This debate goes directly to the question raised on the first day of negotiations: whether the Convention will meaningfully reshape existing international tax arrangements or operate largely within their constraints. 

Civil society interventions pushed delegates to think more ambitiously about what ‘fair allocation’ should mean. CCFD-Terre Solidaire called for the Convention to provide the future Conference of the Parties with a mandate to develop a framework for taxing multinational enterprises on the basis of their total profits, pointing toward unitary taxation as a viable alternative to the existing system. 

Public Services International (PSI), meanwhile, highlighted a striking omission from the factors relevant to value creation: labour. Workers are affected by international tax policy, while their labour contributes directly to the economic activity and profits that States are attempting to tax. PSI therefore called for labour to be explicitly recognised within Article 5. 

Others focused on the changing nature of economic activity. Several interventions stressed that taxing rights cannot depend exclusively on physical presence. Digital services, remote economic activity and other evolving business models increasingly allow companies to generate substantial revenues within jurisdictions without maintaining a traditional physical presence there. Questions of ‘value creation’, ‘real economic contribution’ and the role of users and markets therefore remain central to determining how taxing rights should be allocated. 

These discussions demonstrate why Article 5 cannot be reduced to the avoidance of double taxation or double non-taxation. Fair allocation is also a distributive question: which States should have the right to tax cross-border income, and on what basis? 

 

Article 6: Will the Convention Commit States to Taxing High-Net-Worth Individuals? 

Article 6 produced one of the clearest debates of the day over the strength of the Convention’s obligations. 

A broad group of delegations argued that the current draft has been weakened compared with earlier versions. India questioned the replacement of language requiring States to ‘develop and implement’ measures with the softer commitment to cooperate to enhance’ them. It also challenged the addition of the word ‘general’ before ‘information’ in relation to exchanges concerning high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) and questioned the weakening of language on coordinated taxation from a firmer commitment to merely ‘exploring’ coordinated approaches. 

Brazil, Zambia (speaking on behalf of the African Group), Kenya, Honduras, Pakistan, Morocco, South Africa and others supported variations of the same basic position: Article 6 should impose an obligation to act rather than simply an obligation to discuss cooperation. 

The African Group proposed restoring ‘develop and implement’ in paragraph 1, deleting ‘general’ from the information-sharing provision, and replacing ‘explore’ with ‘adopt’ in relation to coordinated approaches. It also opposed the specific reference to sovereignty in Article 6, arguing that sovereignty is already recognised among the Convention’s overarching principles. 

Kenya similarly argued that these changes would turn Article 6 into a more meaningful implementation commitment, while Nigeria questioned the logic of repeatedly invoking sovereignty in a treaty that States voluntarily agree to be bound by. 

There was, however, considerable agreement across negotiating blocs on one problem: who counts as a high-net-worth individual (HNWI)? 

Delegations repeatedly called for greater clarity or a definition of HNWI. Yet a single global monetary threshold would create its own problems. A level of wealth considered exceptional in one country may have an entirely different significance in another. 

One civil society proposal offered an alternative: define HNWIs relative to the distribution of wealth within each State, using a common methodology periodically updated by the Conference of the Parties. This could provide a common international standard while accounting for very different national economic circumstances. 

The debate matters far beyond tax administration. HNWIs are particularly capable of structuring wealth and assets across jurisdictions, making purely domestic approaches insufficient. Effective taxation therefore requires international cooperation, access to information, and, potentially, coordinated approaches to taxation. 

As several civil society interventions emphasised, the consequences are distributive. When those with the greatest resources can avoid taxation, the burden shifts downward while governments lose resources that could otherwise finance education, health, social protection, and other economic and social rights. 

 

Article 7: What Makes a Financial Flow 'Illicit'? 

If Article 6 exposed disagreements over the strength of commitments, Article 7 revealed a more fundamental disagreement over definitions. 

The provision addresses tax-related illicit financial flows (IFFs), tax avoidance, and tax evasion. Delegations broadly agreed that cross-border tax abuse requires international cooperation. They disagreed sharply, however, over how these concepts relate to one another. 

Several delegations, including Czechia, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Poland, raised concerns about treating tax avoidance and tax evasion as forms of illicit financial flows. Their central objection was that tax avoidance can involve conduct that remains lawful under domestic legislation, whereas ‘illicit’ could be interpreted as referring to illegal activity. They therefore called for clearer distinctions among the concepts. 

The African Group and several developing countries approached the issue differently. Zambia, speaking for the African Group, called for stronger language requiring States to ‘develop and implement measures’ to combat tax-related illicit financial flows rather than simply ‘cooperate’. India similarly stressed the relationship among illicit financial flows, tax evasion and tax avoidance and supported restoring an obligation to develop and implement measures. 

Algeria emphasised the stakes for African countries, which lose enormous resources through illicit financial flows, and warned that replacing an obligation to act with an obligation merely to cooperate weakens the Convention. Senegal likewise argued against simply deleting references to avoidance and evasion, noting that the three concepts may overlap even if they are not identical. 

Nigeria articulated one of the central conceptual disagreements particularly clearly: ‘illicit’ need not necessarily mean ‘illegal’. Conduct can comply formally with the law while nevertheless undermining the tax base and defeating the purpose of tax rules. 

ATAF made a similar argument. From its perspective, the Terms of Reference require the Convention to address tax avoidance, tax evasion and illicit financial flows, all of which can produce the same consequence for developing countries: the depletion of resources needed for development. ATAF therefore defended language broad enough to encompass aggressive tax planning even where individual arrangements remain technically lawful. 

A possible route through the disagreement emerged from civil society: rather than defining avoidance and evasion as necessarily ‘illicit’, Article 7 could impose parallel duties to combat tax-related illicit financial flows and to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion. This could preserve the substantive scope of the provision without forcing agreement that all three concepts are legally identical. 

 

The Question Running Through Day 2 

The negotiations over Articles 5, 6 and 7 concerned very different areas of international taxation, but the same tension repeatedly surfaced. 

Should the Convention require States to develop, implement and adopt measures, or merely to cooperate, enhance and explore? 

Those distinctions may appear technical. They are not. 

A framework convention necessarily leaves substantial detail to future protocols, decisions and institutional processes. But if its core provisions establish only broad aspirations to cooperate, future negotiations may begin without a sufficiently strong legal foundation for reform. 

Article 5 will help determine where profits can be taxed. Article 6 will determine how seriously the international community confronts the ability of extremely wealthy individuals to structure their affairs across borders. Article 7 will determine the scope of cooperation against financial practices that drain States of revenue. 

In each case, the question is ultimately whether the Convention will simply facilitate cooperation within the international tax system as it currently exists, or establish commitments capable of changing it. 

 

 

DAY 3

 

 

By the third day of negotiations, discussions had begun to shift. Earlier debates had focused on the Convention's broad objectives, the allocation of taxing rights, and commitments to combat tax avoidance and illicit financial flows. On 5 August, however, negotiations turned increasingly toward the institutional architecture that will determine whether those ambitions can ultimately be realised.

Articles 8, 9 and 10 raised questions that reached beyond their technical subject matter. How should harmful tax practices be identified and addressed? How can disputes be prevented and resolved across jurisdictions? What forms of mutual administrative assistance should States be expected to provide to one another? Across these provisions, the same political divide continued to emerge. Should the Convention establish new multilateral commitments under the United Nations, or should it simply reinforce cooperation through institutions and standards developed elsewhere?

At stake was not merely the wording of individual provisions. The debates increasingly revealed competing visions of how international tax governance itself should function after the Convention enters into force.

 

Article 8: Harmful Tax Practices, Building New Standards or Deferring to Existing Ones?

The morning opened with negotiations on Article 8, which addresses harmful tax practices. While virtually every delegation agreed that harmful tax practices undermine international tax cooperation and erode domestic resource mobilisation, consensus quickly dissolved over how the Convention should respond.

A familiar fault line reappeared.

A number of developed countries, including the United Kingdom, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, South Korea, Japan, and others, argued that the Convention should explicitly recognise or build upon work already undertaken in other international forums, particularly the OECD's work on harmful tax practices. Their concern centred on legal certainty, consistency and the avoidance of duplication. Several delegations questioned what 'gap' the Convention was intended to fill if comprehensive frameworks already existed elsewhere. Others warned that introducing alternative standards could create overlapping obligations and uncertainty for tax administrations.

Many developing countries viewed the issue very differently.

The African Group, supported by Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Honduras, India and others, argued that references to existing forums risked subordinating the new UN process to institutions in which many countries had never participated on equal terms. Several delegations emphasised that the Convention's mandate, as reflected in the Terms of Reference, already requires negotiators to consider existing work. Repeating specific references throughout the Convention, they argued, could unintentionally endorse standards that were negotiated without universal participation.

As India observed, previous work should neither be ignored nor automatically accepted. The relevant question is whether those standards were developed through transparent, inclusive and non-discriminatory processes that genuinely reflected the interests of all States. Where they have done so, they may provide useful guidance. Where they have not, the Convention should remain free to develop new approaches.

This debate reflects a broader constitutional question that has surfaced repeatedly throughout the negotiations.

If the Convention continually defines itself through reference to pre-existing institutions, its ability to reshape international tax governance may become significantly constrained. By contrast, if it retains sufficient institutional autonomy, it could gradually develop genuinely universal standards through the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies.

 

From Cooperation to Commitment

The discussion also revealed disagreement over the legal strength of Article 8 itself.

The current draft relies primarily on language encouraging States to cooperate and explore common approaches. The African Group and many developing countries instead called for more concrete obligations requiring States to adopt measures to identify, prevent and eliminate harmful tax practices.

Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Nigeria and others proposed replacing softer language such as 'explore' with stronger commitments requiring States to 'adopt measures'. Several delegations also argued that the Conference of the Parties should be given responsibility for developing objective criteria to identify harmful tax practices and for monitoring implementation over time.

The distinction may appear semantic. It is not.

Throughout these negotiations, seemingly modest differences between verbs -'cooperate,' 'explore,' 'develop,' 'adopt,' or 'implement'- have repeatedly become proxies for deeper disagreements about the Convention's future legal force. Framework conventions inevitably leave significant detail to future protocols and institutional decisions. Yet the strength of those future processes depends upon the commitments embedded in the Convention itself. A Convention that merely encourages cooperation provides a weaker foundation than one that establishes clear obligations capable of progressively shaping State conduct.

 

What Makes a Tax Practice 'Harmful'?

Negotiators also grappled with a question that appears technical but carries significant legal consequences: how should harmful tax practices be defined?

Many delegations, including Jamaica, Tanzania, Mauritius, and several civil society organisations, called for objective criteria or an explicit definition to ensure consistency across jurisdictions. Without shared standards, States could reach conflicting conclusions about what constitutes a harmful practice, potentially undermining implementation and creating uncertainty.

Others urged greater caution.

Brazil questioned whether a detailed definition was necessary at this stage of the Convention, while India warned against introducing language that could create excessive subjectivity before States have negotiated future protocols. Several delegations suggested that broad principles could be established now, with more detailed criteria developed later through decisions of the Conference of the Parties.
The debate illustrates an enduring challenge for framework conventions.

Defining concepts too narrowly may prevent institutions from adapting to new forms of tax competition and avoidance as they emerge. Leaving them entirely undefined, however, risks inconsistent interpretation and uneven implementation. Several interventions therefore pointed toward an intermediate approach: establish the Convention's objectives now while empowering future institutional bodies to elaborate detailed criteria through subsequent protocols and decisions.

 

The Broader Question Beneath Article 8

Although discussions focused on harmful tax practices, the underlying political question was considerably broader.

Should international tax governance remain anchored primarily in institutions whose membership has historically been limited, or should the United Nations become the principal forum for developing future standards?

That question surfaced repeatedly throughout the day.

Countries supporting stronger references to existing forums emphasised continuity, coherence and legal certainty.

Countries advocating greater institutional independence emphasised universality, equal participation and democratic legitimacy.

Neither objective is inherently incompatible with the other. The challenge for negotiators is determining whether the Convention can build upon existing experience without becoming constrained by institutional arrangements that many States believe require fundamental reform.

 

Article 9: Preventing Tax Disputes Before They Arise

If Article 8 focused on the substance of international tax cooperation, Article 9 shifted attention to one of the practical realities of implementing any future convention: disputes between taxpayers, tax administrations and States are inevitable. The question was therefore not whether disagreements would occur, but whether the Convention should establish meaningful obligations to prevent and resolve them.

Unlike earlier debates, relatively little disagreement emerged over the importance of dispute prevention itself. Delegations broadly accepted that effective dispute resolution contributes to legal certainty, facilitates cross-border investment and strengthens confidence in international tax cooperation.

The disagreements instead centred on scope.

Several delegations, including India, Norway, Czechia, Austria, the Russian Federation, Israel and the United Kingdom, questioned what kinds of disputes Article 9 was actually intended to address. Was it confined to cross-border tax disputes between States? Could it extend to domestic disputes? Or was it intended simply to establish a broad principle that would later be elaborated through Protocol II?

These questions were not merely requests for drafting clarification. They reflected broader concerns about the legal consequences of the Convention.

Many delegations argued that the binding obligations set out by Article 9 should be be sufficiently precise for States to understand the commitments they are assuming upon ratification. Several countries therefore called for explicit references to cross-border disputes and stronger links between Article 9 and the future protocol intended to operationalise dispute prevention and resolution.

Developing countries largely approached the discussion from a different perspective.

The African Group, supported by Nigeria, Cameroon, Morocco, Mauritius and others, emphasised that Article 9 should establish a genuine commitment by States Parties to create effective dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms. Rather than weakening the provision through broad qualifiers concerning national needs or capacities, several delegations argued that the Convention should clearly require States to adopt measures that ensure tax disputes are resolved fairly, transparently and efficiently.

Brazil similarly supported clarifying that the Article primarily concerns cross-border disputes while stressing that including a commitment within the Convention itself would enable future monitoring of States' implementation through the institutional mechanisms established under the Convention.

Once again, a familiar pattern emerged.

Many developed countries sought greater precision before accepting stronger legal commitments. Many developing countries argued that the Convention would lose much of its practical value if it failed to establish meaningful obligations capable of guiding future implementation.

 

The Relationship Between the Convention and Future Protocols

Article 9 also exposed a broader institutional issue that resurfaced throughout the afternoon.

Framework conventions necessarily delegate much of their operational detail to future protocols. Yet negotiators repeatedly questioned where the appropriate boundary should lie between commitments contained in the Convention itself and obligations deferred to later negotiations.
Several delegations expressed concern that the current drafting blurred this distinction.

Germany, speaking as co-lead of Workstream III, cautioned against attempting to draft the Convention around the anticipated content of future protocols. Conceptually, it argued, the Convention should establish the overarching legal framework, while protocols should elaborate specific mechanisms rather than define the Convention's core commitments.

Others took the opposite view.

India argued that if Article 9 is intended to serve as the foundation for Protocol II, then the Convention itself must clearly identify the types of disputes to which the future protocol will apply. Without that clarity, States would be negotiating future institutional arrangements without an agreed understanding of the legal commitments those arrangements are intended to implement.

This debate reflects one of the central challenges facing the Convention as a whole.

The Convention must remain sufficiently flexible to accommodate future developments while also providing enough legal certainty to ensure that subsequent protocols are built upon a coherent and predictable foundation.

 

Article 10: Mutual Administrative Assistance - A New System or Better Access to Existing Ones?

The afternoon negotiations moved to Article 10, concerning mutual administrative assistance in tax matters.

Few delegations questioned the importance of administrative cooperation itself. Exchange of information, simultaneous tax examinations, assistance with tax collection and other forms of administrative cooperation have long been recognised as essential tools for combating cross-border tax abuse.

The disagreements instead focused on whether the Convention should establish new legal commitments or simply reaffirm cooperation through mechanisms that already exist.

Once again, two competing visions of the Convention became apparent.

The United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Ireland, and several other delegations repeatedly questioned how Article 10 would relate to existing international instruments, particularly the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC). If comprehensive cooperation mechanisms already exist, they argued, negotiators must explain precisely what additional value this Convention would provide.

Several delegations also warned that overlapping obligations could create legal uncertainty or duplicate existing institutional arrangements. Others argued that many of the detailed forms of administrative assistance listed in the draft would be better addressed through future protocols rather than embedded directly within the framework convention itself.

For many developing countries, however, the problem was not duplication but exclusion.

The African Group, supported by Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Algeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Morocco, the African Union and others, repeatedly emphasised that many States were never equal participants in developing existing instruments and, in some cases, remain outside them altogether.

As Ghana observed, the very purpose of negotiating a Convention within the United Nations is to create a framework developed through universal participation rather than by invitation.

Several interventions therefore rejected suggestions that the Convention should simply defer to existing mechanisms. Instead, they argued that the Convention should establish its own legal basis for mutual administrative assistance while allowing future protocols to elaborate technical details over time.

The distinction reflects competing understandings of what universality requires.

For some delegations, universality means enabling broader participation within existing institutional arrangements.

For others, universality requires creating new institutions negotiated from the outset on an equal footing by all Member States.

 

How Strong Should the Commitments Be?

As with earlier articles, the negotiations returned repeatedly to the legal strength of the Convention's obligations.

The African Group proposed strengthening the opening paragraph by requiring States Parties to promote mutual administrative assistance through firmer language and by replacing qualified obligations, such as identifying barriers 'if and as appropriate', with commitments to remove those barriers altogether. Several delegations also proposed adding a new paragraph empowering the Conference of the Parties to develop guidance, protocols and additional instruments necessary for implementation.

Brazil likewise suggested replacing the detailed list of forms of administrative assistance with a broader commitment that could later be elaborated through decisions of the Conference of the Parties.

Many developed countries favoured the opposite approach.

Rather than strengthening obligations, they argued that the Convention should remain at a high level, leaving operational commitments to optional protocols. Numerous delegations, including Switzerland, Norway, Belgium, Austria, Japan, South Korea and Israel, also insisted that States should retain the ability to enter reservations, particularly if detailed obligations remain within the Convention itself.

These interventions again illustrated the broader negotiation dynamic.

Developing countries generally sought stronger institutional commitments within the Convention itself, viewing future protocols as mechanisms for implementation.

Many developed countries preferred a lighter framework convention supported by optional protocols, thereby preserving greater flexibility for States when deciding which obligations to accept.

 

An Emerging Institutional Divide

By the close of the third day, discussions increasingly suggested that the Convention is no longer being negotiated solely as a collection of substantive tax rules.

Rather, negotiators are deciding how authority over the international tax system will be exercised in the decades ahead.

Debates over harmful tax practices, dispute resolution and mutual administrative assistance repeatedly returned to the same institutional questions.

Who should develop future standards? How much authority should be entrusted to the Conference of the Parties? How much should remain with existing international forums? And how binding should the Convention's commitments be before future protocols are negotiated?

These questions may appear procedural. In reality, they will shape whether the Convention evolves into a genuinely universal system of international tax governance or operates primarily as a coordinating framework alongside institutions that already exist.

The third day therefore marked an important evolution in the negotiations. Earlier discussions had focused on what the Convention should achieve. Increasingly, negotiators are now debating who will possess the authority to realise those ambitions, how future rules will be developed, and whether the institutional architecture being negotiated today will prove capable of delivering the transformative international tax cooperation that many States have called for throughout the process.

 

 

DAY 4

 

 

The fourth day of negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation turned from the Convention’s substantive commitments to the institutions that will determine what happens to them after adoption.

Articles 13 through 20 address the Conference of the Parties (COP), subsidiary bodies, data collection and review, the Secretariat, financial resources, amendments and future protocols. While these provisions can appear procedural, they will determine how the Convention is implemented, monitored, and developed as the international tax system evolves.

Across the negotiations, there was broad agreement that the current draft requires greater clarity. Delegations stressed the need to define the powers of the COP, its relationship with subsidiary bodies, the scope of reporting and review, the role of the Secretariat, and the procedures through which future decisions will be taken.

The deeper disagreement concerned what kind of institutional architecture that clarity should produce.

A number of developing countries argued for a strong COP capable of overseeing implementation and ensuring that the Convention remains responsive to future challenges. The African Group called for the COP to be expressly recognised as the supreme organ of the Convention and its protocols, with a clear mandate over implementation, subsidiary bodies, financial arrangements and capacity-building. The African Union similarly stressed that simply establishing a COP does not necessarily give it the authority required to fulfil these functions.

Others placed greater emphasis on the limits of that authority. Several delegations stressed that the COP should facilitate implementation but should not create substantive obligations beyond those expressly accepted by States Parties. Concerns about sovereignty, domestic constitutional requirements, and the legal status of COP decisions featured prominently throughout the discussion.

The divide was therefore not simply between those favoring a strong or weak COP. There was considerable agreement that States cannot be bound by new treaty obligations without their consent. The harder question is how much authority the COP should possess to implement and develop the Convention within those boundaries.

For a framework convention legal architecture, that distinction becomes particularly relevant. Many details of the future international tax system will necessarily be decided after the present negotiations conclude. The institutions created now must therefore be capable of responding to future developments without leaving States uncertain about the obligations they have agreed to assume.

 

Consensus, Majority and the Ability to Evolve

These competing visions became particularly visible in the debate over decision-making.

A significant group of delegations supported consensus as the principal rule for COP decisions, arguing that it would protect State sovereignty, strengthen legitimacy and encourage broad participation in the Convention.

The African Group and several developing countries instead supported majority decision-making, while Côte d’Ivoire proposed a middle ground: consensus should remain the primary principle, but where it cannot produce a decision, a qualified majority should be able to do so.

The same disagreement resurfaced under Article 19, concerning amendments to the Convention and its protocols. Several delegations again argued for consensus, pointing in particular to the sensitivity of taxation, domestic law and existing bilateral treaty obligations. The African Group and others supported majority voting, while stressing that decisions concerning amendments to a particular protocol should be taken only by States Parties to that protocol.

The debate goes beyond procedure.

Consensus can protect States from decisions they strongly oppose. But an absolute consensus requirement can also give individual States an effective veto over the future development of the Convention. At the same time, allowing decisions to proceed by majority does not resolve the separate question of whether new obligations can bind States that have not accepted them.

The challenge is therefore to preserve State consent without making disagreement synonymous with institutional paralysis.

 

Who Participates After the Convention Is Adopted?

In contrast, there was striking convergence around the importance of participation by civil society and other stakeholders.

Delegations from across regions supported explicit provisions allowing civil society organizations, academia, international and regional organisations and other stakeholders to participate as observers. The African Group importantly called for this participation to extend not only to the COP but also to its subsidiary bodies.

This distinction will be critical.

Much of the substantive work of the future Convention is unlikely to occur in plenary meetings of the COP. Technical standards, implementation questions, and proposals for future action will instead be developed through subsidiary bodies and working groups. Participation limited to the COP could therefore allow stakeholders to comment on proposals only after much of the substantive work has already occurred.

The same question of inclusion arose in relation to States themselves.

Discussions under Article 14 highlighted the importance of equitable geographical representation in subsidiary bodies. A number of developing countries stressed that technical bodies should not reproduce the inequalities in participation that have characterised existing international tax rulemaking.

There was also broad agreement that subsidiary bodies should provide technical expertise and support implementation while remaining accountable to the COP. Some developing countries favored establishing specific bodies from the outset, including in areas such as tax treaties, dispute resolution, the digital economy, and high-net-worth individuals. Others favored greater flexibility and carefully defined mandates.

The question is therefore not only who has a seat in the COP, but who participates in the technical spaces where the Convention’s future rules will actually be shaped.

 

From Information to Accountability

Articles 15 and 16 moved the negotiations from institutional structure to the information required to assess whether the Convention is working.

There was broad support for evidence-based implementation and recognition that meaningful review requires reliable data. Delegations nevertheless sought greater clarity over what information States would be expected to collect and share, who would determine relevant standards, and how that information would feed into the review process.

A recurring concern was that reporting requirements should not become open-ended or impose unnecessary administrative burdens, particularly on States with more limited capacity.

The discussion also clarified that draft Article 15 is intended to concern information and statistics relating to implementation of the Convention rather than the exchange of information concerning individual taxpayers. Even so, confidentiality and data protection remained prominent concerns, with calls for safeguards concerning anonymisation, aggregation and compliance with applicable confidentiality and data-protection requirements.

The debate revealed a difficult balance.

Without reliable and comparable information, the COP will struggle to assess implementation, identify gaps or determine where technical assistance is needed. But a review mechanism that imposes unclear or disproportionate reporting obligations could place the greatest burden on countries with the least administrative capacity.

Data collection is therefore not simply a technical exercise. It forms part of the Convention’s accountability architecture. The institutions created by the Convention will need enough information to assess whether commitments are being implemented while ensuring that review remains proportionate and adequately safeguarded.

 

Institutions Need Resources

The discussions of the Secretariat and financial resources made clear that institutional ambition will ultimately depend on institutional capacity.

The African Group supported a Secretariat capable of doing more than administering meetings, including supporting subsidiary bodies and research, facilitating documentation, assisting developing countries in meeting information requirements, and supporting capacity-building. It also proposed a regionally representative technical advisory committee to provide expertise to the COP, Secretariat and subsidiary bodies.

Others favored a leaner Secretariat focused primarily on technical and administrative functions and sought clearer limits on its mandate.

But Article 18 exposed a more fundamental issue: who will pay for the institutional architecture States are creating?

Several developing countries argued that the draft does not yet provide sufficiently predictable financing. Brazil called for the administrative budgets of the COP, Secretariat and subsidiary bodies to be supported through regular contributions from States Parties. Nigeria similarly called for greater clarity about how States Parties would finance the Convention’s activities, while the African Group supported a funding structure combining required contributions with voluntary and other sources.

Côte d’Ivoire warned that reliance on unpredictable voluntary financing could ultimately prevent the Convention’s institutions from functioning. Others were more cautious about creating additional financial obligations and called for greater clarity about the financial implications of the institutional arrangements.

Financing is not separate from institutional design.

A COP cannot oversee implementation without resources, subsidiary bodies cannot provide sustained technical expertise without financing, and commitments to capacity-building and equitable participation will have limited effect if the resources necessary to deliver them remain uncertain.

Formal equality also means little if some States lack the resources to participate consistently in the institutions where the Convention’s future work takes place.

 

Cooperation, Autonomy and Future Protocols

A familiar question from earlier days also resurfaced: how should the institutions created by the Convention relate to international tax work undertaken elsewhere?

There was broad recognition that the COP should not operate in isolation and should be able to draw upon relevant expertise and cooperate with international and regional organisations.

But several developing countries stressed the distinction between cooperation and subordination.

Zambia argued that considering work undertaken in other fora should not make the COP subsidiary to them. Côte d’Ivoire similarly called for the Convention to preserve its institutional autonomy.

The question is not whether existing expertise should be discarded. It is whether institutions created through a universal process will possess the authority to assess existing standards and decide whether they should be retained, modified or replaced.

Without that autonomy, moving international tax cooperation to the United Nations could change the forum without fundamentally changing where authority over international tax rules resides.

Draft article 20 brought the related question of future protocols into sharper focus.

There was broad agreement that States Parties to the Framework Convention should not automatically become bound by protocols they have not joined. A significant number of delegations nevertheless argued that this optionality should be made more explicit in the text.

Others considered the existing language sufficient and cautioned against wording that could create uncertainty about the relationship between the Framework Convention and protocols intended to implement, elaborate or supplement it.

Protocols are central to the logic of a framework convention: they allow international cooperation to deepen over time without requiring every substantive issue to be resolved in the initial treaty.

But that flexibility requires clarity about the distinction between commitments undertaken by all States Parties and additional obligations accepted only by States that choose to join a protocol.

The framework must therefore be capable of evolving without making future cooperation coercive, contrary to broader international legal standards.

 

The Question Running Through Day 4

The negotiations over Articles 13 through 20 were ostensibly about institutional arrangements. Beneath the technical questions, however, lay a more fundamental issue: what kind of governance system will States create to carry the Convention forward once the negotiations end?

A framework convention necessarily leaves important work for the future.

The COP will oversee implementation and confront questions that negotiators cannot resolve today. Subsidiary bodies will provide the technical expertise needed to translate commitments into practice. Data and review mechanisms will determine whether implementation can be assessed and where additional action or support is required. The Secretariat will provide the infrastructure necessary to sustain those processes. Amendments and protocols will provide mechanisms through which the framework can evolve.

The decisions taken now will determine whether those institutions can fulfil those functions.

Decision-making and amendment rules will determine whether the Convention can act when States disagree. Participation rules will determine whether civil society and other stakeholders can contribute before decisions have effectively been made. The composition and financing of subsidiary bodies will determine whether universality extends to the technical spaces where future standards are shaped. Data and review provisions will determine whether implementation can be assessed without creating disproportionate burdens or compromising confidentiality. And the financing of the COP, Secretariat and subsidiary bodies will determine whether the institutional architecture has the resources to function and whether States with fewer resources can participate meaningfully in its work.

Creating a universal framework for international tax cooperation therefore requires more than bringing all States into the negotiating room. It requires institutions capable of carrying that universality forward after the negotiations conclude.

The question underlying Day 4 was not simply how the Convention will be governed, but whether its governance structures will have the authority, capacity and resources necessary to deliver the more inclusive and equitable system of international tax cooperation that brought this process to the United Nations in the first place.

 

 

DAY 5

 

 

The fifth day of negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation brought the first week to a close with a fundamental question: what will happen when the commitments made in the Convention encounter the international tax system that already exists?

Much of the day centered on Article 21, which addresses the relationship between the Framework Convention and existing agreements, instruments, and domestic law. The negotiations then moved through the Convention’s final provisions, including dispute settlement, signature and ratification, reservations, entry into force, and withdrawal.

Together, these discussions exposed a tension that has run throughout the negotiations, and the following ‘short blanket’ scenario: States broadly agree that the Convention should attract wide participation and coexist with existing tax cooperation instruments (mostly bilateral and regional). If the Convention is intended to reform international tax cooperation, it must also be capable of delivering substantive changes in the rules and agreements through which the international tax architecture currently operates.

The question under dispute, and perhaps the biggest ‘elephant in the room’ throughout the week, was on how far the Framework Convention should go in reconciling both positions.

 

What Happens to the Existing Tax Treaty System?

Article 21 generated one of the clearest divisions of the week.

Several delegations stressed that the Framework Convention should complement rather than override existing tax agreements. They argued that bilateral tax treaties reflect negotiated balances between States, have often been ratified through domestic constitutional processes, and provide legal certainty for governments and taxpayers.

Particular concern focused on paragraphs 3 and 4, which contemplate progressive steps to align existing agreements with the Convention, including through renegotiation, and provide for follow-up on those efforts.

For many delegations, these provisions went too far.

The UAE warned against creating an affirmative obligation to reopen existing treaties, arguing that renegotiation should remain subject to mutual agreement. A number of European and other delegations similarly called for paragraphs 3 and 4 to be deleted or substantially redrafted. Questions were repeatedly raised about what 'compatibility' or 'alignment' with the Framework Convention would mean, who would determine whether an existing treaty is compatible, and what legal consequences would follow where it is not.

The concerns were not limited to bilateral treaties. Delegations also asked how the Convention would interact with multilateral agreements, supranational law and domestic legal systems.

Underlying many of these interventions was a concern about sovereignty: States should understand the legal obligations they are accepting before the Convention can require changes to agreements negotiated elsewhere.

But another group of States approached Article 21 from almost the opposite direction.

India argued that the purpose of negotiating a new global framework is precisely to agree to principles that have not necessarily been accepted in existing fora. If States voluntarily undertake commitments through the Convention, it argued, they should be prepared to align domestic laws and other agreements with those commitments. Removing the provisions that give effect to that alignment risked making the article, and ultimately the Convention itself, ineffective.

Brazil similarly cautioned against losing sight of the article’s purpose. While accepting that its wording could be improved, it opposed eliminating the obligation to take progressive steps toward alignment and defended reporting as a mechanism for accountability.

The African Group went further.

Speaking on its behalf, Zambia described Article 21 as 'load bearing': the provision that would determine whether the commitments negotiated in the Convention actually change the rules through which international taxation operates. It supported a standing obligation to take progressive steps toward alignment and proposed strengthening the COP’s role in determining how existing agreements should be brought into conformity with the Framework Convention.

For several African countries, existing tax treaties are not a neutral baseline to be preserved. Kenya stressed that many treaties involving developing countries were negotiated under unequal conditions and continue to constrain domestic resource mobilisation. A Convention designed to make international tax rules fairer and more inclusive cannot achieve that objective if inconsistent existing arrangements remain permanently insulated from change.

The disagreement therefore concerned two different understandings of what it means to respect sovereignty.

For some States, sovereignty requires preserving national discretion over whether and when existing treaties are renegotiated. For others, ratifying the Framework Convention is itself an exercise of sovereignty: once States voluntarily accept its commitments, implementation requires giving those commitments practical effect.

 

Reform Without Legal Uncertainty

The intensity of the Article 21 debate also revealed a problem that cut across negotiating blocs: States do not yet share a common understanding of how different parts of the emerging Convention will interact.

Questions arose about the relationship between Article 21 and the Convention’s substantive commitments, the review mechanism, future protocols and existing treaties. The United Kingdom called for an explanatory note, arguing that delegations appeared to be working from different understandings of what the Convention’s binding legal commitments would actually require.

The optional nature of protocols makes this particularly important.

If a substantive rule is ultimately contained in a protocol that only some States join, can Article 21 require an existing bilateral treaty to be aligned with that rule where one treaty partner has not accepted the protocol? Conversely, if existing treaties always prevail, how much practical effect can new allocation rules developed under the UN framework have?

These are not merely drafting questions.

The Framework Convention is being negotiated within a dense network of existing legal instruments. Its success will depend partly on whether States, tax administrations and taxpayers can understand which rules apply when those instruments point in different directions.
But legal certainty cannot simply mean preserving the status quo.

A framework designed to reform international tax cooperation will inevitably create some need for existing laws, treaties and practices to change. The challenge is to establish clearly when that change is required, how it should occur, and which commitments trigger it.

The search for compromise under Article 21 will therefore need to reconcile two objectives that cannot simply be traded against one another: ensuring that the Convention has meaningful legal effect while giving States sufficient certainty about what they are agreeing to implement.

 

How Much Flexibility Can a Common Framework Accommodate?

That same tension returned forcefully under Article 25, this time through the debate over reservations.

A substantial number of delegations argued that States should be permitted to enter reservations to at least some provisions of the Framework Convention. They warned that an absolute prohibition could prevent countries from joining where particular obligations conflict with domestic legislation, constitutional requirements or existing international commitments.

For these States, reservations could increase participation by allowing governments to join the broader framework while preserving flexibility over provisions they are not yet able to accept. Malaysia warned that a prohibition on reservations could itself prevent States from signing, while China and Guatemala pointed to differences in domestic legal systems as reasons for greater flexibility.

Norway captured the underlying trade-off: broad reservations could fragment the Convention, but if the final text contains obligations that States consider too far-reaching, prohibiting reservations could instead undermine broad participation. The appropriate balance would therefore depend on the Convention as a whole.

The African Group took a different view.

It supported the current prohibition on reservations, arguing that broad participation should not come at the expense of the Convention’s objectives. Kenya pointed to other international instruments that restrict reservations, while Zambia warned that allowing States to opt out of individual commitments could leave negotiators with a watered-down framework whose common obligations exist largely on paper.

The African Union similarly argued that the Framework Convention is intended to establish a common foundation for international tax cooperation. If States can enter extensive reservations, Parties could effectively participate in different versions of the same Convention, weakening the integrity of the framework.

India questioned what meaningful reservations would look like in practice. A State could hardly join a Convention while rejecting its objectives and principles or the basic commitment to fair allocation of taxing rights. Brazil took a somewhat more cautious position, suggesting that the question should ultimately be assessed against the final package: a Convention built primarily around obligations of cooperation and best efforts might require little room for reservations, while more direct obligations could change that assessment.

This debate brought the question of inclusivity into sharper focus.

Is the most inclusive Convention the one that allows the greatest number of States to join, even if they accept different combinations of obligations? Or does meaningful inclusivity require States to participate on the basis of a common set of commitments?

The answer will depend in part on what the final Convention actually asks States to do.

 

Resolving Disputes Without Recreating Inequality

Article 22 raised another aspect of implementation: what happens when States disagree over the interpretation or application of the Convention?

Delegations broadly recognized the need for a dispute-resolution mechanism but sought greater clarity over the current text, including its references to 'peaceful means' and conciliation. Some questioned whether conciliation needed to be separately specified or whether domestic constitutional rules might prevent its use in tax matters.

The African Group stressed that dispute resolution should be capable of operating not only in relation to the Framework Convention but also its protocols. ATAF similarly called for a mechanism with an active role in helping States resolve disputes arising across the framework.

Questions of accessibility also emerged. Effective dispute resolution requires time, expertise and legal resources. If procedures are too expensive or complex, formal access to a mechanism may not translate into equal capacity to use it.

As elsewhere in the Convention, institutional design therefore has distributional consequences.

A dispute-resolution system must provide enough structure to make commitments meaningful without reproducing disparities in States’ ability to defend their interests.

 

Broad Participation, But on What Terms?

The remaining final provisions raised fewer fundamental disagreements, but they reinforced the importance of designing a Convention capable of attracting and retaining broad participation.

Delegations discussed whether signature and accession should remain open-ended, how many ratifications should be required before the Convention enters into force, and how withdrawal and possible re-entry should operate. Some cautioned that the entry-into-force threshold should be high enough to ensure that the Convention begins with meaningful participation across the international community, while not becoming an obstacle to its operation.

These may appear to be conventional final clauses, but they connect directly to the more substantive debates of the day.

A Convention with ambitious obligations but few Parties will struggle to reshape international tax cooperation. A Convention designed principally to maximize signatures, but whose commitments can be extensively avoided or insulated from existing tax arrangements, risks universality without transformation.

The negotiations are therefore not simply seeking the largest possible number of Parties. They are determining what States must share in common for participation in a universal framework to be meaningful.

 

The Question Running Through Day 5

Day 5 brought into focus a challenge that will follow negotiators into the next stage of the process: how can a new international tax framework change an existing system without making participation in that framework impossible?
Article 21 posed the question most directly.

If existing treaties and domestic arrangements can continue indefinitely regardless of the commitments States accept under the Framework Convention, the new framework may struggle to alter the international tax rules it was created to reform. But if the Convention creates unclear or automatic obligations to reopen existing agreements, States may hesitate to join or remain uncertain about the legal consequences of doing so.

The debate over reservations presented the same dilemma from another direction.

Flexibility can facilitate broader participation, but too much flexibility risks creating a Convention whose Parties do not share a meaningful common baseline. Restricting reservations can preserve the integrity of the agreement, but only if the underlying obligations are sufficiently clear and acceptable to attract broad participation in the first place.

These tensions are particularly consequential because the negotiations are not taking place on a blank slate.

International taxation already operates through thousands of bilateral treaties, domestic tax systems, regional arrangements and multilateral instruments. The Framework Convention must find its place within that architecture while also providing a mechanism for changing the parts of it that States have come to the United Nations to address.

The first week therefore ended where many of its debates began: with competing understandings of what a genuinely inclusive international tax system requires.

For some, inclusivity means preserving sufficient flexibility for States with different legal systems, treaty networks and national circumstances to participate. For others, it means ensuring that existing rules, many of which were developed without equal participation by all States, do not determine the limits of what can now be achieved.

The success of the Framework Convention will ultimately depend on reconciling those two ambitions.

A universal Convention must be broad enough for States to join. But if it is to deliver the change that brought this process to the United Nations, it must also be strong enough for joining it to matter.